What is spousal maintenance?
Spousal maintenance (also known as periodical payments) means regular income payments to support a former husband or wife. Spousal maintenance may be used to assist in achieving a fair outcome on divorce, nullity or judicial separation. The court will take into account the principles of needs, compensation and sharing when determining whether spousal maintenance is required.
A spousal periodical payments order is a continuing obligation for one party to pay the other a weekly or monthly sum. In some cases, periodical payments can be secured by a capital deposit, where the paying party makes an upfront payment into a fund; the money in the fund is then used to pay the party receiving the payments. In financial proceedings the courts in England and Wales have a wide discretion as to how they deal with each case, and it will consider the individual facts of each case when determining the duration and amount of any spousal maintenance it thinks should be paid.
Spousal periodical payments may be made for such term as the court thinks fit. The term for which spousal periodical payments are made can be extendable or non-extendable. If the term is non-extendable, the court can direct that the party receiving the payment may not apply to extend the term of the order. If the term is extendable, there must be ”exceptional justification” for the term to be extended.
Regardless of the duration of any spousal maintenance order, if the party receiving payment remarries or enters into a civil partnership the payments will usually cease.
Spousal periodical payments will stop if either party dies, unless they are secured periodical payments, in which case they will only stop if the party receiving the payment dies. If the paying party dies, the secured periodical payments will continue to be paid to the surviving party out of the capital deposit that was paid by the deceased party at the outset.
Spousal maintenance can be a complex area of law and therefore if you wish to discuss this further we would advise that you speak with one of our specialist matrimonial solicitors.
Related FAQs
On 13 March 2020 the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government issued a Written Statement in respect of delivery restrictions.
In this respect, many supermarkets, food retailers and distribution centres in England operate under planning restrictions (conditions and/or obligations) which limit the time and number of deliveries from lorries and other delivery vehicles which can take place particularly at night primarily to protect the residential amenity of nearby residential property.
Key points in the Statement include;
- Given the exceptional challenges facing the UK from the coronavirus, it is vital that deliveries of food, sanitary and other essential products over the coming weeks can be made as quickly and safely as possible, minimising disruption to the supply chains. The likely pressures on driver capacity mean additional flexibility is needed so that retailers can accept deliveries throughout the day and night where necessary.
- That planning enforcement is discretionary and that local planning authorities should act proportionately in responding to suspected breaches of planning control.
- That local planning authorities should not seek to undertake planning enforcement action which would result in unnecessarily restricting deliveries of food and other essential deliveries during this period having regard to their legal obligations.
The Statement acknowledges that the increased frequency of deliveries particularly at night could have a temporary impact on residents. It therefore concludes that the Government will review the need for the flexibility outlined in the Statement after the pressure from the coronavirus has reduced and that it is the intention to withdraw it once the immediate urgency has subsided.
A link to the Written Statement is below.
According to the guidelines laid down by the Treasury, many Start-up businesses will not be considered “viable” as they are at an early stage in the investment cycle (i.e. delivering negative returns but with strong growth prospects). This means they are unlikely to qualify for CBILS although for primarily UK based Start-ups it is still worth making enquiries as policies are rapidly evolving.
For early-stage businesses in their first two years of trading, the British Business Bank’s Start-Up Loans programme (loans £500 to £25,000 at 6% p.a. interest) may be more suitable. Visit www.startuploans.co.uk for more information.
For start-up businesses that are unable to access CBILS, the Government launched The Future Fund in May 2020 via the British Business Bank, which provides convertible loans to UK-based innovative companies ranging from £125,000 to £5 million, subject to at least equal match funding from private investors. This scheme is available until 30 September 2020 initially.
Your business is eligible if:
- it is UK-incorporated – if your business is part of a corporate group, only the parent company is eligible
- it has raised at least £250,000 in equity investment from third-party investors in the last five years
- none of its shares are traded on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility or other listing venue
- it was incorporated on or before 31 December 2019, and
- at least one of the following is true: (i) half or more employees are UK-based; and/or (ii) half or more revenues are from UK sales.
Further information is available on the Government website, www.gov.uk/guidance/future-fund
The Government is also offering additional support for small and medium size firms that are primarily focused on research and development. This targeted support is available through a continuity grant and loan scheme. The grant scheme is only available until 29 May 2020 while the loan scheme is open for applications until all the money is allocated or 31 December 2020 (whichever is earlier). This scheme is administered by Innovate UK, the national innovation agency, and this support will mostly only be available to existing Innovate UK customers.
Further information is available on the on the Government website, www.gov.uk/government/publications/access-coronovirus-business-innovation-support-package
It could be possible depending on your contract. If there is no force majeure clause in a contract, it may be possible that the contract may have been “frustrated” by emergency legislation. In legal terms, a contract can be frustrated where an event occurs after it is entered into which was not contemplated by any party at the outset, is not due to the fault of any party, and which makes the performance of the contract impossible.
If this is the case, the contract could be “discharged”, meaning that the parties’ obligations under the contract are no longer binding.
It is possible that a contract could be frustrated within this particular legal doctrine by a change in the law that makes performance of a contract illegal. However, if it simply becomes more difficult, or more expensive, then the legal tests for frustration might not be satisfied. There are also limits to the application of the rule if the frustrating event was already known about at the time the contracted was entered into.
Again, careful legal advice will be required at an early stage. The rules about force majeure or frustration might help businesses that find themselves unable to perform a contract because of the coronavirus outbreak.
Any new contracts that are concluded should expressly deal with the possibility that performance might become more difficult, more costly, or impossible to perform.
This is unlikely. Frustration is a doctrine rarely used as a way of getting out of leases. It operates to bring a lease to an early end because of the effect of a supervening event. It is then not a concept readily applicable to a situation where one party is looking to get out of a lease. To be able to argue the doctrine of frustration, you must be able to demonstrate that something unforeseeable has happened that makes it impossible to fulfil the lease and unjust to hold a party to its obligations.
This is not something that can be demonstrated easily.
There was a case in the High Court last year when the doctrine of frustration was looked at in a case involving the European Medical Agency.
The court found that Brexit did not frustrate EMA’s lease. EMA was granted leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal, but unfortunately, the parties settled out of court so the arguments were not tested in the higher court.
Another reason why frustration is likely to fail is an argument that, whilst the current lockdown may force closures to businesses and whilst such closures maybe for a lengthy period, such closures will only be temporary.
The Act was obviously subject to much debate and criticism as the Bill passed through Parliament. It is difficult to properly assess any gaps until after the necessary secondary legislation has been published and comes into force (along with the remainder of the Act), but some of the likely issues include:
- The impact on the insurance market, and the (lack of) availability and increased cost of insurance in light of the provisions of the Act
- How the introduction of retrospective claims will affect the market, both in relation to how parties might go about trying to prove matters which are 30 years old, but also the lack of certainty for those potentially on the receiving end of these claims which they previously had by virtue of the Limitation Act provisions
- Whether the definition of higher risk buildings is correct, or will require some refinement.
The Martlet v Mulalley case provides some useful observations and clarifications, for example that designers cannot necessarily rely on a ‘lemming’ defence that they were simply doing what others were doing at the time, that ‘waking watch’ costs are generally recoverable, and commentary on certain specific Building Regulations. The judgment however made clear that much of the case turned on its specific facts, so it is useful from the perspective of providing some insight as to how the Courts will deal with cladding disputes in future, rather than setting significant precedents to be followed.